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Abstract. The privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) has been one of the most
interesting, yet challenging, research issues. In the PPDM, we seek to outsource
our data for data mining tasks to a third party while maintaining its privacy. In this
paper, we revise one of the recent PPDM schemes (i.e., FS) which is designed for
privacy preserving association rule mining (PP-ARM). Our analysis shows some
limitations of the FS scheme in term of its storage requirements guaranteeing a
reasonable privacy standard and the high computation as well. On the other hand,
we introduce a robust definition of privacy that considers the average case privacy
and motivates the study of a weakness in the structure of FS (i.e., fake transactions
filtering). In order to overcome this limit, we introduce a hybrid scheme that
considers both privacy and resources guidelines. Experimental results show the
efficiency of our proposed scheme over the previously introduced one and opens
directions for further development.
Keywords: privacy preservation, data sharing, association rule mining, resources
efficiency, average and worst case privacy.
1 Introduction
The data mining is a powerful tool for discovering knowledge such like hidden pre-
dictive information, pattens and correlations from large databases [1]. However, since
the data itself may include information that can lead to user identification, the privacy
preserving data mining (PPDM) has became of a great interest [2]. In the PPDM al-
gorithms, not only the accuracy of the mining result but also the privacy of the data
itself is considered [3]. Since the first work by Agrawal et al. [2], several PPDM al-
gorithms have been developed though the challenge of data privacy has not been to-
tally solved. These algorithms are basically classified under two directions: crypto-
graphic and non-cryptographic (i.e., randomization-based) algorithms [4]. While it is
believed that the cryptographic based approaches are computationally infeasible for
most of the existing data mining models due to the large data size, the randomization-
based algorithms suffer from the problem of their low accuracy [5,6]. Though, the ran-
domization based algorithms have been favored over the cryptographic algorithms and
therefore several PPDM algorithms based on randomization technique have been in-
troduced. These algorithms include data clustering [7,8,9,10], association rule mining
[11,12,13,14,15,16,17], data classification [18,19,20,2], etc.
One of the interesting, though challenging, data mining applications is the associa-
tion rule mining (ARM) [21,22]. The ARM is a well researched method for discovering
interesting relations between variables in large databases. When adding the privacy
concern to ARM, the privacy preserving association rule mining (PP-ARM) aims to
discover such relations between the variables in the data while maintaining the data pri-
vacy. To do so, several algorithms have been introduced including the aforementioned
works in [11,12,13,14,15,16,17].
One of these works (in [14] and will referred through the rest of the paper as FS)
considered adding fake transactions to anonymize the original data transactions in order
to maintain their privacy. This work has several advantages over other existing schemes
including that any off-the-shelf mining algorithm can be used for mining the modified
data and the ability of providing a high theoretical privacy guarantee though being sub-
ject to several limitations. In this paper, we revise the FS scheme and show several
results:
– We show an average case study of the privacy preservation in FS that better express
the real privacy consideration.
– In order to provide a high privacy measure, the FS scheme requires an exhaustive
amount of storage. Even for same level of privacy with other existing schemes such
like PS[11], FS scheme still requires higher storage (section 4).
– In practice, the privacy provided by the FS can be breached given that the original
transactions are not modified and kept in the released modified data. Similarly, the
fake transactions since they are larger in number than the real transactions in most
cases can be filtered and affect the overall attained privacy (section 4).
– Also, to take advantage of the FS and reduce its memory requirements, we intro-
duce a hybrid scheme that utilizes both FS and PS schemes (section 6).
– We introduce a thorough theoretical and experimental analyses that demonstrates
the achieved properties of both the revised and hybrid schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the preliminaries,
definitions and notations. Section 3 details the procedure of the PP-ARM using the
fake transactions FS scheme, section 4 introduces the first part of our contribution by
revisiting the FS scheme, and section 5 lists some remarks motivating the need for
hybrid scheme, describing the PS scheme (the MASK), and comparing it to the FS
scheme. Section 6 introduces our hybrid scheme and it properties over other schemes in
term of privacy, resources, and error (in both analytical and experimental formulations).
Finally, section 7 draws concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries and Definitions
2.1 Why does privacy matter?
In order to illustrate the importance of the privacy when considering data mining, we
provide several examples. These examples are recalled from the health, marketing, and
law areas.
Example 1 (Health care system). A hospital would like to release health care data for
external research purposes. However, insurance companies (the attacker) are interested
in knowing the health record of the patients and their parents (privacy). Given that if
somebody’s parents have a specific disease then the they (i.e., the children) may have
the same disease with high probability, they insurance companies may increase the
insurance of the children in order to guarantee a high margin of profit.
Example 2 (Marketing and competition). A retailing company would like to know the
pattern of customers choice and future directions from a given marketing records that it
already has. One of the possible options for that company is to outsource its own data
to a third party that performs the mining task and discover any interesting patterns and
provide them back to the company. While this data is not important for many people,
it would be important for other companies which competing on the same market (the
attacker). Therefore it is required to provide an image of the data that can imply the
required task without revealing additional information to the third party.
Example 3 (Regulations and laws). According to several currently applied regulations
and laws, personal data is preserved and can not be stored permanently or used for mak-
ing decision by other party. Specially, as data mining algorithms build decision on data
patterns, it is hard to remove the bias of decision based on gender or race. An example
of such regulations includes HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act)1.
2.2 Major Notation
– FS: the PP-ARM algorithm using fake transactions in [14].
– PS: the PP-ARM algorithm using data masking in [11].
– PPSr : reconstruction probability when using the PS algorithm.
– P FSr : reconstruction probability when using the FS algorithm.
– PPSp : quantification of preserved privacy when using PS algorithm.
– P FSp : quantification of preserved privacy when using the FS algorithm.
– w,w1, w2: general parameters used for the ARM with fake transactions to represent
the ratio of fake to real transactions.
– R1, R0: reconstruction probability of ones and zeros in PS respectively.
– a: privacy parameter in PS scheme which determines the ratio according to which
ones and zeros are handled.
Note that other notations are defined and used in the context of this paper as well.
2.3 Data Model
The market basket model is used for the ARM 2. In the market basket, each user par-
ticipates with a tuple (also called transaction) in the database where the data tuples are
of fixed length as a sequence of ‘0’ and ‘1’. The columns in the database represent
the products (i.e., items) where the existence of ‘1’ in the tuple indicates a purchase
1 www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/
2 Note that this model is figurative where the applications is not limited to data driven from
market model but any other models as well (see the above examples).
of the specified product and the existence of ‘0’ indicates no purchase. Since the users
normally buy a smaller fraction of products than the whole number of products in the
market, the number of ‘1’s is much fewer than the number of ‘0’s. The goal of the
mining process is to compute the set of association rules in the database that satisfy
a specific criterion. For general representation, the data can be represented as follows
[23]:
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where a(j)i = 1 if and only if the item i of the user j is selected (marked, bought,
access, etc) or equal to 0 otherwise.
2.4 Definitions
Definition 1 (association rules). [12] Let the whole itemset be I = {a1, a2, a3 . . . , an}
and T is a set of N transactions where T = {t1, t2, . . . , tN} where each transaction ti
is a subset of I . The association rule is a statistical implication which can be expressed
as follows: X ⇒ Y where X,Y ⊆ I , X ∩ Y = φ.
The association rule X ⇒ Y is said to have a support s if X ∩ Y appears in s% of T .
Also, the association rule is said to have c confidence if c% of the T that satisfy X also
satisfy Y . While the support is a measure of the significance of the association rule, the
confidence is used as a measure of strength. Also, an association rule is of interest if
both c and s are greater than some threshold. According to the Apriori mining algorith,
finding the association rule in a dataset is equivlant to finding the frequent itemsets in
that associations rule. An itemset is frequent if its support is greater than a threshold.
Formally, the support of the itemset is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Support of Itemset). [14] LetA be a set ofn items where I = {a1, a2, a3 . . . , an}
and T is a set of N transactions where T = {t1, t2, . . . , tN} where each transaction ti
is a subset of I . The support of A is defined as follows:
suppT (A) =
#{t ∈ T |A ⊆ t}
N
(2)
Example 4. Let the items be I={m, c, p, b, j}, and the minimum support be smin = 3.
Also, let the set of transactions (tuples) be t1 ∼ t8 shown as follows
t1={m, c, b}
t2 = {m, p, j}
t3 = {m, b}
t4 = {c, j}
t5 = {m, p, b}
t6 = {m, c, b, j}
t7 = {c, b, j}
t8 = {b, c}
From the transactions, we can systematically derive the representation matrix in
terms of ones and zeros representing the existence and absence of a specific item in
each transaction.
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
t8


1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0


By applying the support model in (2) on the above data matrix, we obtain the fol-
lowing frequent itemsets and their support respectively: {m}, {c}, {b}, {j}, {m, b}, {c,
b}, {j, c} and their supports are 58 , 58 , 68 , 48 , 48 , 38 , and 38 .
Definition 3 (Privacy measure). [14] The privacy is defined as the probability accord-
ing to which the distorted data can be reconstructed.
Definition 4 (False positive σ+). [11] This false positive estimation happens when
k−itemset with a support slightly less smin is supported with more FT than other
k−itemsets (included).
Definition 5 (False negative σ+). [11] This false negative estimation happens when
k−itemset with a support slightly greater than or equal smin is supported with less FT
than other k−itemsets (discarded)
3 Association rule mining with fake transactions
Unlike the previously introduced scheme by Evfimievski et al [13], which is per-transaction
noise addition scheme, the ARM using fake transactions scheme [14] (PS for brevity)
adds fake transactions as a mean of noise in between of the real transactions in the
database. The privacy in FS is determined by the quality and quantity of the fake trans-
actions added in between of the real transactions. The quantity of fake transactions is
determined according to the parameterw which represents the ratio of fake to real trans-
actions and the parameter l which determines the average length of the fake transactions.
The parameter l is chosen to be same as the average length of the real transactions and
the parameter w is chosen based on the desirable quantification of privacy to be at-
tained (P FSp ). The P FSp can be expressed in terms of the hardness of filtering the the real
transactions from the fake transactions (P FSr ) given as
P FSr =
N
n+Nw
=
1
1 + w
(3)
The P FSp is then given as P FSp = 1 − P FSr = 1 − 1w+1 . Technically, the FS scheme
consists of two parts which are the data anonymization and the data mining parts. For
the data anonymization, the following procedure is performed:
1. Determine li as a realization of uniformly distributed random variable with mean l
that is equals to the average length of the real transactions (i.e., 1 ≤ li ≤ 2l− 1).
2. Determine w(i) as the number of fake transactions to be inserted between two real
transactions (specifically for two real transactions with index i and index i+1 in the
real database). For a predefined w (i.e., mean), w(i) is determined as a realization
of a uniformly distributed random variable with mean w (i.e., 1 ≤ wi ≤ 2w − 1).
3. li number of items are selected from I to construct a fake transaction.
4. The process is performed for w(i) times for the current insertion.
5. The w(i) number of fake transactions generated above are inserted between the real
transactions with indexes i and i+ 1.
The above steps are performed for the next pair of tuples (i.e., N − 1 times) for the N
tuples in the database. For the data mining part (i.e., learning the association rules from
the anonymized data), the following steps are performed:
– The new minimum support of a transaction of k-itemset in the list of anonymized
transactions T ′ is computed.
– Using any off-the-shelf algorithm (such like the apriori algorithm), the association
rules are driven according to the new minimum support.
The procedure of computing the new minimum support is driven according to the fol-
lowing steps: Given a fake transaction t of length Y and k-itemset A, the probability
that t supports A is:
pk =
Cn−kY−k
CnY
=
CYk
Cnk
, (when Y ≥ k and 0 otherwise) (4)
The number of fake transactions that support k-itemset is approximately given as
follows
2l−1∑
Y=k
CYk
Cnk
×
w ×N
2l− 1
=
wN
Cnk (2l− 1)
2l−1∑
Y=k
CYk (5)
Assume the support of A ∈ T ′ is s′ (i.e., suppT
′
(A) = s
′), then the number of
transactions in T ′ that support A is s′(1 +w)N . Therefore, the number of real transac-
tions that support A in T ′ is given as follows:
s
′
(1 + w)N −
wN
Cnk (2l− 1)
2l−1∑
Y=k
CYk (6)
If we consider the real support to be s, then it is possible to write the above formula
as s = s
′
(1 + w) − w
Cn
k
(2l−1)
∑2l−1
Y=k C
Y
k . Therefore, we can write the new minimum
support as follows:
s
′
k =
smin +
w
Cn
k
(2l−1)
∑2l−1
Y=k C
Y
k
1 + w
(7)
Since all of the parameters in (7) are known, it is then easy to learn the associa-
tion rules in the anonymized transactions T ′ given the minimum support smin in the
unanonymized set of transactions T . For further details on the FS scheme and its opti-
mization, please refer to [14].
4 Privacy preserving association rule mining revisited
In this section, we revisit the aforementioned FS scheme and introduce three main re-
sults which are as follows: (i) First, we show that the FS scheme is resources exhaustive
(specially in terms of its requirements for high memory in order to provide a reasonable
level of privacy), (ii) we show that the theoretical quantification of the privacy in the FS
follows the worst-case study while the aver can can be better descriptor for the privacy
quantification. We derive a general formula for the average case quantification, and (iii)
we show that using two round attack where the first attack is done by applying common
filters on the data and the second by the random selection, we show that the privacy can
be less than the above two cases.
4.1 Requirements analysis of the FS scheme
The privacy of the FS scheme is merely dependent on the parameters l and w. While the
first parameter does not have any effect on the required memory, the second parameter
which is the determinant factor of the privacy (according to (3)) has a great effect. The
privacy attained by the FS scheme is defined as P FSp = 1−P FSr = 1− 1w+1
3
. In order to
attain a relatively high privacy, w need to be high. For example, to achieve a privacy of
90% (i.e., 0.9 on the 1-scale), w need to be at least 11. That is, the required additional
memory (as one mean of resources) for representing and storing the fake transactions
in T ′ will be 11 times of the original database size. To illustrate the growth of such
functions, Fig. 1 shows different growth regions. In Fig 1(a), the growth is shown for
0 ≤ w ≤ 1 which reflexes the fast growth region attaining 0.5 privacy (i.e., 50%). Fig.
1(b), shows the range of 0 ≤ w ≤ 10 from which we obtain that an increment of 9
in w leads to only 0.4 additional privacy preservation form the case of w = 1 (i.e.,
overall preservation 1). Finally, for the 10 ≤ w ≤ 100, Fig. 1(c) shows that the change
of w by 90 would add a privacy preservation of 0.04 to accumulate 0.99 for the overall
w = 100.
3 Though the function growth may not express the real requirements of the memory, its being
withO( 1
w
) growth function is a clear indicator that the privacy grows slower as w grows larger
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Fig. 1. The attained privacy versus the required w that reflex the required overhead in
terms of memory and computation.
As we early mentioned, the parameter w directly affect the required resources in
term of memory and computation. While the memory part is illustrated above, the re-
quired computation linearly depends on the size of the dataset in which the association
rules to be learned. That is, the increment of the database size in T ′ will requirew times
computational power more than the case of the association rule discovery in T only.
4.2 Average-case for privacy quantification
The privacy attained in the FS scheme according to the description in [14] is referred
to as the worst-case privacy. The worst privacy is driven by assuming that the recon-
struction probability of any tuple in the anonymized database T ′ is equal to the recon-
struction probability of the first (thus the worst) tuple. In other words, the probability of
all tuples is assumed to be equal. However, since the attacker is assumed to reconstruct
tuples successively without replacement, the necessity for defining an average case pri-
vacy exists. In the following (theorem 1), we define the average-case privacy and show
its relation to the worst-case privacy in [14].
Theorem 1 (average-case privacy). The quantification of privacy in [14] considers
the best reconstruction probability of a single record (i.e., worst case privacy measure)
while the real privacy preserved (at average) is greater than the worst case quantifica-
tion.
Proof. Consider an adversary A interested in obtaining the whole set of real transac-
tions by applying a random selection process. For the sequence of trials to obtain the
transactions t1 . . . tN ∈ T
′
, the following is the probability for successful reconstruc-
tion of the N real transactions anonymized in the set of w ×N fake transactions.
Pr =
1
N
[
N
wN +N
+
N − 1
wN +N − 1
+ · · ·+
N − (N − 1)
wN +N − (N − 1)
]
=
1
N
× (p0 + p1 + · · ·+ pN−1) (8)
Then, it is easy to verify that pi > pi+1 for 1 < i < N − 1. Take for example i = 1
then N
wN+N >
N−1
wN+N−1 . By multiplying both sides by
wN+N−1
N
, we get wN+N−1
wN+N >
N−1
N
which is valid for any w > 0 and N > 2 (note that these conditions are always
valid under the real data assumptions). We can similarly extend the above result to any
i > 1 and say that c × pi >
∑c
j=0 pi+j for any i ≥ 1 and c ≥ 1. That is (as a
special case by substituting i = 1 and j = N − 1), N × p1 >
∑N−1
i=0 pi which means
p1 >
1
N
∑N−1
i=0 pi. However,
1
N
∑N−1
i=0 pi = Pr and p1 = P FSr . Then, P FSr > Pr . From
the final result, we get that.
P FSr > Pr
1− P FSr < 1− Pr
P FSp < P
PS
p
′
(9)
where P FSp and P FSp
′
are the quantification of privacy preserved in the FS scheme in
[14] and at average case introduced by us, respectively. 
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Fig. 2. The average versus the worst case privacy preservation
Note that the last result of the average-case privacy quantification is more general
and better express the real situation of the privacy attained according to the definition
in [14]. Specially, this privacy is more suitable for modeling the attack below.
4.3 On fake transactions filtering
The main concern in [14] has been the filtering (and therefore the reconstruction) of the
real transactions inserted in between of the fake transactions. However, an adversary
A might be interested in removing some of the fake transactions which are obvious in
order to maximize the chances of obtaining the real transactions in the remaining set of
transactions according to the aforementioned privacy quantification model.
The above is possible because, practically, it is not possible to generate fake trans-
action that typically resemble the distribution of the the original data. This is specially
obvious when the distribution of the the dataset is unknown or biased. This shortcoming
opens a great chance for filtering the weak fake transactions using many off-the-shelf
statistical tools. Moreover, given additional information on the distribution of the user
choice in the data it is further possible to filter high amount of fake transactions. Gen-
erally speaking, however, the filtering may take one, or even both, of the following
strategies:
– Random filtering: since the number of the fake transactions in T ′ is greater than
the number of real transactions, specially when w > 1, then it is more likely to
select a transaction at random such that the selected transaction belongs to the set
of fake transactions.
– Guided filtering: given enough information to A about the distribution of the real
and fake transactions and the choice of users (in general), A can easily (with high
certainty) filter a large amount of the fake transactions.
In order to study the impact of this filtering on the quantified privacy preservation,
let the efficiency of the filter applied on T ′ be γ where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Then, it is easy to
extend the result in (8) to the following:
P (γ)r =
1
N
[
N
(1 − γ)wN +N
+
N − 1
(1− γ)wN +N − 1
+ · · ·+
N − (N − 1)
(1− γ)wN +N − (N − 1)
]
(10)
Similarly, we can define the new average-case privacy (given γ) as
P FSp
′ (γ)
= 1− P (γ)r = 1−
N−1∑
i=0
N − i
(1− γ)wN +N − i
(11)
To illustrate the impact of the filtering on the privacy preservation, Table 1 shows
the quantified privacy preservation for different filtering efficiency parameters γ and
different values of w.
5 Remarks and Extensions
Obviously, the FS scheme introduces some great properties and, yet, suffers from some
drawback which are summarized as follows
– Unlike other schemes (such like the PS scheme), the FS scheme introduces the-
oretically high privacy given enough resources (i.e., computation and memory).
Though, such resources are a drawback for high privacy.
Table 1. qunatified privacy preservation under several filtering efficiency factors.
quantification of preserved privacy
w = 1 w = 2 w = 3 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7 w = 8 w = 9 w = 10
γ = 0.0 0.6929 0.8108 0.8629 0.8925 0.9115 0.9248 0.9347 0.9422 0.9482 0.9531
γ = 0.1 0.6722 0.7951 0.8506 0.8823 0.9029 0.9174 0.9281 0.9363 0.9429 0.9482
γ = 0.2 0.6485 0.7766 0.8358 0.8701 0.8925 0.9083 0.9200 0.9291 0.9363 0.9422
γ = 0.3 0.6208 0.7544 0.8177 0.8549 0.8795 0.8969 0.9099 0.9200 0.9281 0.9347
γ = 0.4 0.5882 0.7271 0.7951 0.8358 0.8629 0.8823 0.8969 0.9083 0.9174 0.9248
γ = 0.5 0.5490 0.6929 0.7660 0.8108 0.8410 0.8629 0.8795 0.8925 0.9029 0.9115
γ = 0.6 0.5007 0.6485 0.7271 0.7766 0.8108 0.8358 0.8549 0.8701 0.8823 0.8925
γ = 0.7 0.4395 0.5882 0.6722 0.7271 0.7660 0.7951 0.8177 0.8358 0.8506 0.8629
– The presence of the (bare) real transactions in between of the fake transactions
enables a great chance of real/fake transactions filtering leading to reduction of the
privacy.
Based on that, there is a great chance to utilize and extended version of the FS scheme
that maintain its advantages and reduces (or overcomes) its disadvantages. Here, we
recall another scheme of PP-ARM from the literature (PS) and explain how a hybrid
scheme of both the PS and FS (referred as HS) will maintain the aforementioned goals.
5.1 MASK for privacy preserving association rule mining
The distortion of the data using the MASK scheme (i.e., PS scheme) is very simple
when applied on a database defined according to the above model of the market basket
(i.e., (1). To preserve the privacy, the data owner performs the following:
– Each tuple in the database is considered as a random variable X = {Xi} where
Xi = 0 or 1.
– The distortion follows the following procedure: Y = distort(X) where Yi = Xi ⊕
r¯i where r¯i is complement of ri which is a realization of a random variable with
the probability distribution function f(r) = bernoulli(p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
The implication of such random variable is that ri takes a value ‘1’ with probability p
and ‘0’ with probability 1 − p. For the case of ri = 1 the original bit Xi in the data
tuple is kept same (with probability p) and for the case of ri = 0 the original bit Xi is
altered to its complement. On the other hand, the privacy of the PS scheme is estimated
by the probability according to which the reconstruction of zeros and ones is possible4.
1. Reconstruction of ones according to R1 = Pr{Yi = 1|Xi = 1}Pr{Xi = 1|Yi =
1}+Pr{Yi = 0|Xi = 1}Pr{Xi = 1|Yi = 0} =
s0×p
2
s0×p+(1−s0)×(1−p)
+ s0×(1−p)
2
s0×(1−p)+(1−s0)×p
.
2. Reconstruction of zeros according to R0 = Pr{Yi = 1|Xi = 0}Pr{Xi = 0|Yi =
1}+Pr{Yi = 0|Xi = 0}Pr{Xi = 0|Yi = 0} =
(1−s0)×p
2
(1−s0)×p+s0×(1−p)
+ (1−s0)×(1−p)
2
s0×p+(1−s0)×(1−p)
.
4 Note that this definition for the privacy is better the previous one since it implies an average-
case reconstruction per bit.
The overall probability of reconstruction is given as follows.
PPSr = aR1 + (1 − a)R0 (12)
Where a is a privacy parameter (for more details on the derivation, refer to [11]).
The amount privacy preserved is given as follows:
PPSp = 1− P
PS
r = 1− (aR1 + (1− a)R0) (13)
The miner simply compute the minimum support smin for all candidate in the ran-
domized tuples that maps to the same original tuple requiring only a linear number of
counters. That is, the computation overhead linearly dependent on the size of the dataset
and the length of the each itemset (in the worst case)5.
5.2 Comparison
In this section, we compare the two aforementioned schemes and point out their strength
and shortcomings. Obviously, the PS scheme requires no memory overhead (apart from
the required from representing the data itself) while the FS scheme requires memory
space for the additional wN number of fake transactions used to hide the real trans-
actions. Such memory can be tens of gigabytes for an ideal database limiting the later
schemes feasibility and applicability.
The PS scheme has an upper bound for the quantified privacy. That is, for the max-
imum possible p, the attained privacy is equal to 89%. While this is possibly sufficient
for some applications, for many privacy critical applications this would be a a great
enough breach [13]. On the otherh and, the overhead in the FS scheme is merely depen-
dent upon the allowed amount of overhead.
Both schemes excessive privacy results in a relatively higher error of the mining
algorithm. Also, while the PS scheme requires modification in the mining algorithm to
maintain a reasonable computation overhead, the FS scheme can use any off-the-shelf
algorithm for mining. Table 2 shows a concluding comparison between the two schemes
above.
Table 2. Comparison between the FS and PS schemes
Feature PS scheme FS scheme
Memory Overhead 0 O(wN).
Computation ∼ N ∼ wN
Mining Algorithm Modified off-the-shelf
5 Also this is considered an additional merit of the PS over the FS. Further optimization tech-
nique is shown in [24] as well.
6 Hybrid scheme for association rules
Our scheme utilizes the two introduced schemes above to have their advantages to-
gether and reduce from their disadvantages specially related to the memory overhead
and limited privacy.
6.1 HS for PP-ARM
Our hybrid scheme (HS from brevity) works as follows: first fake transactions are pro-
duced using the same way of the FS scheme and inserted in between of the real trans-
actions for the whole set of transactions in the database then the modified database
is distorted using the procedure of the PS scheme. The scheme is detailed as follows
(analysis is omitted):
PHSr
def
= P FSr P
PS
r =
PPSr
1 + w
(14)
PHSp
def
= 1− PHSr = 1−
PPSr
1 + w
(15)
since both P FSr and PPSr are less than zero, the resulting probability P totalp is always
greater than either of the two probabilities.
6.2 Measures and Metrics
To study the characteristics of the HS scheme, we use the following three criteria (1)
Privacy measure (Lemma 1), (2) Error measure, (3) Overhead measures in terms of
computation and memory (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. The quantified privacy preserved using our hybrid scheme HS is higher
than the preservation using either the PS or the FS alone.
Proof (sketch). Given that 0 ≤ P FSr ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ PPSr ≤ 1 then it is trivial to see
that P FSr PPSr ≤ P FSr and P FSr PPSr ≤ PPSr . That is, 1 − P FSr PPSr ≥ 1 − P FSr and
1− P FSr P
PS
r ≥ 1− P
PS
r which gives PHSp ≥ P FSp and PHSp ≥ PPSp respectively. 
As a special case, it can be easily shown that our schemes’ attained privacy is higher
than PS scheme when PPSp equals to its maximum value (i.e., minimum PPSr ).
Lemma 2. For same privacy level, ourHS scheme requires less storage than FS scheme.
Proof. Let w1 and w2 be two parameters defined for FS and HS schemes respectively.
The privacy attained by each scheme is given as P FSp = 1− 11+w1 and P
HS
p = 1−
P PS
r
1+w2
.
By setting P FSp = PHSp (i.e., attained privacy is equal in both schemes) we get that:
PPSr =
1 + w2
1 + w1
However since PPSr is less than 1 (more specifically, maximum PPSr is equal to 0.89),
the above equality is only possible when w2 ≤ w1. 
Table 3. Error of mining in terms of false positive σ+ and false negative σ− for HS
versus FS considering different parameters w and for p = 0.5 and different minimum
support values.
smin = 0.005 smin = 0.0025 smin = 0.001
scheme w privacy σ+ σ− σ+ σ− σ+ σ−
HS scheme 2 0.833 4.013 2.728 2.341 2.340 2.172 1.503
FS scheme 2 0.667 2.985 1.493 1.607 1.607 1.102 0.701
HS scheme 4 0.900 6.731 4.275 4.762 3.698 1.591 1.620
FS scheme 4 0.800 4.975 2.985 3.214 2.501 1.027 1.152
Example 5. For example, to attain a privacy P FSp = PHSp = 0.95 when PPSr = 0.3, it is
enough to set w2 = 5 while w1 must be at least 19
For the part of the error measurement, represented by false positive and false neg-
ative, we perform the experiment on the dataset BMS-WebView-1 [22]. The used
dataset consists of 59602 transactions where each consists of 497 items and the length
of transaction at average (i.e., l) is equal to 2 [22]. We further set w with two values:
2 and 4 generating fake transactions according to the procedure in 3 and set p = 0.5
according to which the privacy of PS scheme is determined. The measurements for the
error is shown in Table 3.
7 Conclusion and Future Works
The privacy preservation association rule mining (PP-ARM) is a critical issue of re-
search where several are proposed for computing the support of itemset in a randomized
dataset considering different randomization techniques. In this paper, we revisited the
PP-ARM using fake transactions and showed three major results. We first redefined the
privacy to include the average case consideration. We then pointed out the exhaustive
requirements of the FS in terms of memory and computation. We further pointed out
a drawback of the FS in practice by showing it weakness against the fake transactions
filtering. In order to avoid such limitations of the FS, we extend it to a hybrid scheme
with the PS scheme and show in both analytical and experimental result the attained
properties.
In the near future, it will be interesting to investigate the derivation of concrete
error measures (in term of false negative and false positive). Also, we will consider
experimentation over datasets with different parameters (i.e., l, n, and N ).
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